The impact of the price of oil on the stock and bond markets during the crisis in the Persian Gulf : an honors thesis (HONRS 499) by Burgin, Gordon D.
The Impact of the Price of oil On the Stock and Bond Markets 
During the Crisis In the Persian Gulf 
An Honors Thesis (HONRS 499) 
by 
Gordon D. Burgin 
~:ctor~ 
-~T-
Ball State university 
Muncie, Indiana 
May 2, 1991 
Expected Date of Graduation 
May 4, 1991 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. 
ABSTRACT ...•• 
INTRODUCTION .••...... 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION. 
· . . . • • . . . . . . . . 2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3 
.4 
.7 
. .15 
• •••••••••••• 17 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY ...•••••...•..•••••• 21 
TABLE ONE ..••.•••...••••••••••••••.••..••• 23 
BIBLIOGRA.PHY .....••...•••••••••.••••••.••• 24 
Acknowledgement 
I would I ike to thank Dr. Rathina Rathinasamy, Professor of 
Finance, for his guidance in the completion of this project. 
Without his knowledge and help, this project could not have been 
realized. Thank you. 
ABSTRACT 
This study addressed the impact of the oil price on several 
stock and bond indices during the Persian Gulf Crisis. Daily data 
were used in standard regression techniques to determine the impact 
of the oil price. It was found that the oil price had a tremendous 
negative impact on the S&P 500, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
and the Dow Jones Transportation Average, while the price of oil 
had little explanatory power concerning bond prices. 
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I. Introduction 
At a time when the united states economy appeared headed for 
a recession, the stock market moved off of its record high of the 
summer of 1990. Helping the markets in the downward move was 
Saddam Hussein, who ordered his Iraqi army to invade neighboring 
Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The day prior to the invasion the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average closed at 2899.26, almost exactly one 
hundred points off of the record high recorded in late July. 
During the next several months the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
and many other indices, were taken on a roller-coaster ride. The 
cause of this volatility was the price of crude oil. 
The price of oil has been proven to be a major factor in 
inflation. Throop(1991) has shown that oil price can affect 
inflation both directly and indirectly. These effects can lead to 
a wage-price spiral which could be devastating to the economy. The 
direct effect is the immediate mark-up on final goods and services 
due to higher oil prices, while the indirect effect is caused by 
the expectations of higher inflation in the future by workers. 
This expectation leads to the demand of higher wages to compensate 
for the higher prices of goods. Ely and Robinson(1991) have shown 
that inflation can have an impact on the sock markets through what 
is known as the "tax effect." The tax effect is caused by the u.s. 
tax code, and its depreciation allowance. During inflationary 
times, the depreciation write off becomes inadequate due to the 
rising replacement costs of goods because the depreciation base is 
valued at historical cost. The FIFO method of inventory valuation 
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also is detrimental during periods of inflation. When inventory 
is valued using FIFO, the replacement cost is understated. Both 
of the factors cause an increased tax burden on the corporation. 
Due to the increased taxes, the after-tax profit is obviously 
lower, which leads to lower dividends and subsequently to lower 
stock prices. Kling(1985) and Rathinasamy(1990) have both 
contended that the stock market anticipates changes in oil prices. 
Rathinasamy concluded that the stock market anticipated future oil 
prices two periods in advance. However, during the crisis in the 
Middle East and the actual war in Iraq and Kuwait, the markets 
appeared to be incorporate the prices of oil on the very day of the 
price change. The markets were overly driven by the oil price. 
According to the article "stock Market Is Dancing to Oil's Tune" 
in the September 17, 1990 issue of the Wall Street Journal, oil 
became "the latest obsession of stock investors, who love to seize 
upon an economic indicator ... to point the direction they should run 
in." This tendency for investors to focus on only one economic 
variable can lead to high volatility, especially when that variable 
is given a daily price, such as oil. Clearly, the price of oil can 
be very detrimental to the markets. The problem is, however, that 
the markets were overly moved by a panicked market in oil. The 
price of oil did not accurately reflect supply and demand. 
Immediately pre-invasion of Kuwait, the United states had an oil 
glut of 386.7 million barrels(Donnelly, 1990). Saudi Arabia and 
other OPEC countries had increased their output to make up for the 
lost production of both Iraq and Kuwait. On top of that, the 
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united states government stood ready to use the strategic Petroleum 
Reserves, which contains 590 million barrels of oil (Tanner and 
sullivan, 1991). At the beginning of the crisis, many analysts 
were predicting a price of around $23.25 per barrel at the end of 
1990 (Donnelly, 1990). The actual closing price on the final day 
of 1990 was $28.35, and had previously closed at a high price of 
$40.40 on two occasions. clearly the oil market was in a panic. 
This panic spilled over into almost all of the other markets. It 
is no coincidence that the lowest point in the crisis for the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average, the Dow Jones Transportation Index, and 
the S&P 500 all occurred on the day of the highest oil prices of 
the crisis, October 11, 1990. 
Most of the above has focused on the stock markets, but the 
bond markets can also be affected by the price of oil. The higher 
than expected inflation due to the higher price of oil can 
effectively eat into the realized yields of bond investors. It 
could also work in the opposite way. If the price of oil were to 
go lower, the lower than expected inflation would give the bond 
investor a better than expected yield. 
This report will look at the daily closes of the Dow Jones 
Industrials, the S&P 500, the Dow Jones Transports and the daily 
closes of both oil spot and futures prices to determine the effect 
that the oil prices had on the stock markets. The daily Lehman 
Brothers Long T-Bond Index, the Merrill Lynch Corporate Bond Index, 
and the 10+ year Treasury yield will be examined to determine the 
effects of the oil price on the bond markets. 
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II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
1. "The Costs of Anticipated Inflation" 
This article looks at the costs of anticipated inflation. People 
know of the costs of unanticipated inflation, but they feel that 
if inflation is anticipated, then there is no cost to the economy. 
However, this article points out that there indeed are costs 
associated with fully anticipated inflation. 
If nominal rates adjust for inflation so that real rates stay 
the same, there should be no cost to the economy. However, there 
are some factors that cause anticipated inflation to affect the 
economy. The first of these is the effect of taxes. The problem 
with the tax code is the base for depreciation. Depreciation is 
based on the historical cost of the capital rather than the current 
replacement cost. During times of rising prices, the depreciation 
base is not raised. This causes the effective tax rate for the 
businesses to be higher. 
The tax code also causes firms to shy away form investing in 
inventory during inflationary periods. The FIFO method of 
inventory valuation causes firms to have to pay a capital gains tax 
due to the fact that the goods are sold at the inflation boosted 
prices, rather that the old, low price. LIFO accounting takes care 
of the tax problem, but is more complex and reduces pre-tax 
profits. 
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Inflation causes a liquidity constraint among households. 
The nominal interest rate rises much higher than the household 
income during inflationary periods. Households can't borrow 
against future income increases, so it is harder for them to get 
loans. When it is tougher to get loans, less is spent on housing 
and consumer durables. Therefore, the relationship between nominal 
interest rates and residential investment is an inverse one. 
Businesses are more affected by the real rate of interest than the 
nominal rate. 
According to the Fisher Effect, the nominal inflation rate 
should rise by more than the anticipated rate of inflation. 
However, in a simulation of the u.s. economy, the rate doesn't rise 
enough to offset the above mentioned costs of higher effective tax 
rates and the liquidity constraint placed on households. For every 
percentage point that inflation is raised, nominal interest rates 
rose by only 7/10ths of a percent. The simulation suggests that 
a rise in expected inflation reduces real after tax interest rates. 
Businesses will gain relative to households, because they are more 
responsive to real interest rates than to nominal rates. 
A large drop occurs in household investments in consumer 
durables and houses. Even though real rates dropped in the 
simulation, the higher nominal rates caused a 10% decrease in 
durables and a 7.5% drop in residential investment. 
Business investments fell, even though real interest rates 
fell. This is because of the higher effective rate of taxation 
brought about by the fixed depreciation base of historical cost. 
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There is also more foreign investment due to the decreased U.S. 
interest rate. However, this isn't enough to offset the decline 
in domestic investment. The rate of savings in the economy falls. 
More money is spent on consumption, such as non-durables and 
services. 
2. "Oil Prices and Inflation" 
According to Throop(1991), the change in the price of oil has 
2 effects on overall prices: the direct effect and the indirect 
effect. The direct effect is when the rise in prices forces 
manufacturers to pass the higher price to consumers in a mark-up 
of final goods and services. The effect will not be permanent 
unless the Federal Reserve issues more money. The higher oil price 
will slow down the economy, but if the Fed issues more money stock, 
the effect can permanently raise the price level. 
The indirect effect involves the expectations of future 
inflation. Workers will demand higher wages to compensate for 
higher future prices. Because of this, wages tend to increase at 
the rate of inflation plus the expected rate of growth in labor 
productivity. The higher expected inflation rate will, through 
this manner, be passed on the consumers in the form of higher 
prices. When there is a competitive pressure for workers, wages 
will go up faster. Real inflation will then be higher. Workers 
will then raise their demands because of higher expected inflation, 
which will lead to even higher wages. 
price spiral. 
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This can lead to a wage-
The indirect effect that a rise in the price of oil will have 
is based on how it is viewed by labor market participants. If they 
view it as a one-time shock, then it will have no effect on wages. 
However, if they view it as a permanent increase, then they will 
revise their wage demands, which will lead to wage inflation and 
price inflation. If they feel that the Fed will accommodate the 
higher prices by issuing more money than a wage-price spiral could 
occur. 
The market has been able to distinguish well between shocks 
and permanent increases. Less of the effect is passed on to future 
expectations because the markets are increasingly aware that the 
effects don I t have to be permanent. Also, the Fed has been 
committed to keeping prices stable. 
The response of wage inflation to shocks such as the current 
one tend to be small and die out quickly. And the wage response 
is less of an influence now than it used to be. Therefore, the 
current oil price shock is not likely to set off a significant 
wage-price spiral. 
3. "Oil Price Shocks and Stock Market Behavior" 
Although crude oil prices are informative to the future course 
of real economic activity, the stock market may not have known this 
prior to 1973. 
The obj ecti ve of this article is to conduct a thorough 
empirical analysis of the relationships between crude oil prices 
and the stock market for the period 1973-1982 using an aggregate 
10 
measure of the stock market and measures of stock price behavior 
for several industries. 
There are 2 possible relationships between crude oil prices 
and stock prices. The stock market could anticipate future changes 
in crude oil prices and thus are informative with respect to future 
crude oil prices, or stock prices reflect all information in past 
crude prices and adjust contemporaneously to the innovation in 
crude oil prices. If current stock prices do not reflect the 
informativeness of crude oil prices, then you could say that stock 
prices do not adjust contemporaneously, but rather with a lagged 
effect. 
There are two hypotheses: 
1. stock prices were not informative with regard to 
oil prices. 
2. Crude prices were not informative of stock 
prices. 
In other words, one variable could not have been used to predict 
the other. 
The author used a vector autoregressive time series analysis 
and innovation accounting to interpret the data. 
Results show that hypothesis one is reflected with respect to 
the auto industry, capital goods industry and domestic oil 
industry. Current stock prices anticipated future crude oil 
prices. 
Evidence strongly suggests that current and past crude prices 
contained no information relevant in predicting future stock prices 
for the aggregate market. However for certain industries, such as 
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air transport, automobile and domestic oil stocks, there was 
information contained in current and past crude prices that would 
be useful in predicting future values. 
The conclusion is that the stock market did anticipate crude 
oil price changes after 1972. There was a lagged effect on stock 
prices of air transport, automobile, and domestic oil industries. 
4. "The stock Market and Inflation: A Synthesis of The Theory 
and Evidence" 
According to Ely and Robinson(1991) equities don't hold their 
value during inflationary periods, which puzzles many in the 
financial markets. Since stocks are claims on real assets, they 
should hold up against inflation, but they don't. During the 
'70's, the movement in stock prices didn't keep up with general 
price levels. The two main arguments as to why they don't hold 
their value are the tax effect and the proxy effect. 
The tax effect hypothesis says that the adverse effects are 
caused by inflation's effects on after tax earnings of firm's, and 
inflation's effects on individual portfolio selection. The first 
detriment is the fact that the tax code allows depreciation on 
historic cost rather than replacement value. When prices rise, the 
depreciation allowance is not large enough, and real tax 
liabilities increase. Inflation, therefore, leads to a reduction 
in real after-tax profits, and a consequent reduction in real 
dividends and stock prices. Also, if inventory is valued using 
FIFO, then rising prices causes the cost of replacement to be 
understated. These two factors lead to lower profits, dividends, 
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and stock prices. There is a benefit, in that nominal interest 
rates are higher and firms are allowed to deduct interest payments. 
Net tax burden is the benefit of interest deduction and the 
penalty caused by historic depreciation measures. According to a 
simulation, at a low inflation rate the loss outweighs the gains. 
It is estimated that beyond the 7-9% inflation rate, inflation 
reduces corporate tax burden. 
Individuals also have an effect during inflationary times. 
Because of the reduced profitability of holding corporate stocks 
and bonds, they may decide to move into other investments. This 
raises the real cost of raising capital for a firm due to the fact 
that it will be harder to find investors to commit their money. 
This will also raise the discount rate that investors use to value 
securities. Therefore, individual portfolio selection during 
inflationary times will further push down stock prices. 
If inflation is unanticipated, there is another benefit from 
the decline in the firm's outstanding debt. Inflation reduces the 
real value of the firm's liabilities. The tax effect, however, 
cannot be empirically supported. 
The proxy effect hypothesis states that expected future output 
growth and inflation are inversely correlated and inflation is 
merely proxying for expected output or earnings growth in tests of 
the relationship between stock returns and inflation. The 
relationship between inflation and stock prices is spurious. 
There are 3 proposed linkages between expected future output 
growth and current inflation. The first of these is linkage 
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through monetary demand. The expected lower future growth leads 
to lower money demand and higher inflation. The lowering of stock 
values results from lower expected future output growth and a lower 
expected future dividend. Therefore, they are not directly 
related. 
The second proposal is linkage through debt monetization. In 
this proposal, stock returns actually cause inflation. Lower 
current stock returns cause an increase in current inflation. 
The third is linkage through a counter-cyclical policy rather 
than debt monetization. This is again a spurious relationship, 
such as the money demand linkage. 
There is no empirical evidence that either the tax effect or 
the proxy effect is any good. 
5. "The Link Between Crude oil Prices and Common stock Returns: 
The 1983-1986 Evidence" 
The objective of this paper was to link the price of oil to 
the stock market. 
An increase in oil price leads to greater profits for oil 
companies, and oil service industries. However, it also leads to 
higher inflation. 
stock returns are influenced by inflationary expectations. 
Oil prices generally increase inflationary pressures and increase 
bond yields. 
The paper used standard regression methodology on several 
variables. These dependent variables were: the S&P 500 stock 
index, S&P 500 stock return, while the independent variables were: 
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crude Petroleum Producer Price Index, Money Supply (M,) , 
Unemployment, and discount rate. These variables were plugged into 
three different regression equations, with significant negative 
relationships hypothesized between the S&P indexes and the 
independent variables listed. 
The results indicate that there is a negative effect between 
oil prices and the stock market. The adverse change in oil prices 
is anticipated by the stock markets two periods in advance. There 
is also a contemporaneous effect. Inflation and discount rate also 
have a negative affect on the stock market. 
III. Data and Methodology 
Standard linear regression techniques were used to study the 
impact of the price of oil on the stock and bond markets. Data 
were collected daily from the Wall Street Journal to be used as 
variables in the regression models. The data were collected on 
August I, 1990, which was one day before the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, to March 15, 1991, which was approximately two weeks after 
the war in the gulf ended. This gave a data set of 158 
observations. The dependent variables collected include: 
1. The S&P 500-a broad based index used to measure stock 
market levels. 
2. The Dow Jones Industrial Average-an index of 30 IIblue 
chip" stocks used as another measure of stock market 
levels. 
3. The Dow Jones Transportation Index-Index of 
transportation stocks, and industry heavily dependent 
on oil. 
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4. The Shearson-Lehman Hutton T-Bond Index-used as a 
measure of treasury bond price levels. 
5. The Merrill Lynch Corporate Bond Index- used as a 
measure of corporate bond prices. 
The independent variables used in the models were: 
1. The spot price of oil- the price of oil purchased at 
the market price of the day. 
2. The futures price of oil- the price for May 1991 
delivery. 
3. 10+ Year Treasury Yield- used to measure yield of 
long-term Treasury bonds. 
Two basic regression models were used. Both had two 
independent variables. The long-bond yield was used an independent 
variable in each of the equations. The difference in the two 
equations was the second independent variable. This was the oil 
price. The models were run using both the spot and futures prices. 
One would be as good as the other, since the correlation 
coefficient between the two is 98.299%. Regressions were done for 
both, however. The basic regression models are as follows: 
Where 
Y, = a + b, SpotOil + bz IntLong, and 
Yz = a + b, FutrOil + bz IntLong 
Y=dependent variable 
b,=regression coefficient for oil price 
bz=regression coefficient for long bond yield 
a=intercept 
Both models were used for each of the 5 dependent variables listed 
above. 
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IV. Results and Discussion 
The results of the regression models will be given here, in 
the order of dependent variables as listed above. The results are 
presented in table 1. This section will be structured in the 
following mannner: the dependent variable for the equation will be 
given in the major heading after the letter; the subheadings under 
the major heading will be: (1.) the results for the regression 
model with the spot price of oil, and (2.) the results for the 
regression model with the futures price of oil. 
Insert Table One Here 
A. The S&P 500 
1. The spot price of oil was the first to be included in the 
regression model. Wi th the S&P 500 inserted as the dependent 
variable, and overall F value of 261.83 was achieved, which was 
significant at one percent (See Appendix). The F value tests to see 
if at least one of the explanatory variables contributes 
significant information for the prediction of the dependent 
variable. The model produces and R-squared of 77.28 percent. This 
indicates that the model has excellent explanatory power, and a 
majority of the information needed to predict the S&P 500 value is 
given in the model. In breaking the model down further, we see 
that the estimated regression coefficients are 417.206 for the 
intercept a, -3.1566 for the spot price of oil, and .1486 for long 
interest. This indicates that for every one percent increase in 
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the spot price of oil, the S&P 500 will decrease 3.156 percent. 
The t-test, which tests to see if the variable differs 
significantly from zero, gives values of 16.53 for the intercept, -
15.78 for the spot price of oil, and .04 for the long bond yield. 
The intercept and the spot price of oil are significant at the one 
percent level. 
2. The next model used the futures price of oil instead of 
the spot price. The results were very similar to those of the spot 
price, as one might suspect. The model had an overall F value of 
254.76, which was significant at the one percent level. The model 
had an R-squared of 76.91. These two numbers disclose that the 
model has excellent explanatory power, also. The regression 
coefficient estimates for the intercept, futures oil price and long 
yield were 439.484, -4.857, and 1.085, respectively. This 
indicates that for everyone percent increase in the futures price 
of oil, the S&P 500 would decrease 4.857 percent. This is a larger 
decrease than from the spot price of oil, which seems to make 
sense. The futures price is more stable since it is a contract for 
delivery at a later date. The t-test for the three variables are 
17.66, -15.43, and .31. The intercept and futures price of oil 
were significant at the one percent level. 
B. The Dow Jones Industrial Average 
1. The next model will focus on the effect of the spot price 
of oil on the Dow Jones Industrial Average. This model had an 
overall F value of 243.58, which was significant at one percent. 
18 
The R-squared was 75.98 percent, which indicates that this model, 
too, had excellent explanatory power. The regression coefficients 
are 2758.614 for the intercept, -26.040 for the spot oil price, and 
70. 096 for long interest. The t-test for the variables are 14.33, 
-17.06, and 2.75 for the respective variables. All three were 
significant at the one percent level. 
2. The futures price of oil was then inserted as the second 
independent variable. This model produced an overall F value of 
221.25, which was significant at one percent. The R-squared was 
74.31 percent. Hence, this model also has excellent explanatory 
power. The intercept, futures price, and long interest had 
regression coefficient estimates of 2979.406, -39.377, and 71.568, 
respectively. The t-test produced results of 15.32, -16.01, and 
2.64, respectively. Once again, all three are significant at the 
one percent level. 
c. Dow Jones Transportation Average 
1. The focus now shifts to the Dow Jones Transportation 
Average. With the spot price of oil inserted into the model and 
the Dow Jones Transportation average as the dependent variable, the 
model had an overall F value of 282.87, which was significant at 
one percent. The R-squared was very high: 78.60 percent. 
Therefore, this model had very high explanatory power. 1235.161, 
-15.986, and 18.383 were the regression coefficients for the 
intercept, spot oil price, and long bond yield, respectively. 
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These had a t-test of 10.54, -17.20, and 1.18. The intercept and 
spot oil price are significant at one percent. 
2. The futures price of oil produced excellent results, also. 
The model had an overall F value of 351.95, which was significant 
at one percent. The model had a very high R-squared of 82.15 
percent. This is due to the fact that airlines are heavily 
dependent on fuel products. During the fourth quarter of 1990, 
airlines spent over $4.4 billion dollars on fuel. Clearly, the 
industry depends a great deal on oil prices, and it is reflected 
here. The estimates of regression coefficients for the intercept, 
future oil price, and long bond yield are 1293.199, -25.784 and 
32.816, respectively. 
-19.47, and 2.25. 
significant at one 
The t-tests for these variables were 12.35, 
The intercept ad future oil prices are 
percent and the long interest rate was 
significant at five percent. 
D. Treasury Bond Price Index 
1. The model for the T-bond index with the spot oil price 
included as an independent had very little explanatory power. The 
overall F value was 1. 99 and the R-squared was 2.52 percent. it 
is clear that the spot price of oil had very little effect on the 
price of Treasury bonds. 
the ten percent level, 
significant. 
The spot price of oil was significant at 
although no other variables were 
2. The futures oil model also had very little explanatory 
power. The overall F value was 1. 88 and R-squared was 2. 40 
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percent. The t-value of futures oil was 1.86, which was 
significant at ten percent. 
E. Corporate Bond Price Index 
1. The model with the corporate bond index also had very 
little explanatory power. The overall F value of 1.10 and R-
squared of 1. 40 percent show this point. None of the variables had 
t-values which were significant. 
2. The futures model, on the other hand, had an overall F 
value of 799.25 and an R-squared of 91.27 percent. This model 
appears to have excellent explanatory power. The F value is 
significant at the one percent level. The estimates of regression 
coefficients are 742.358669 for the intercept, -.8088841 for the 
futures price of oil, and -28.7049245 for the interest on the long 
bond. All of these variables were significant at one percent. 
IV. Summary and Conclusions 
This study addressed the impact of the price of oil on the 
stock market during the Gulf Crisis and War. Using daily data 
collected from August 1, 1990 to March 15, 1991, and applying 
regression techniques, it was found that the price of oil had a 
significant negative impact on the S&P 500, Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, and the Dow Jones Transportation Average. The price of 
oil had little effect on the bond price indices, except for the 
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futures price of oil, which had a tremendous amount of explanatory 
power concerning corporate bond prices. 
The price of oil had a tremendous effect on the stock markets 
during the Gulf crisis. oil was the dominant factor in moving the 
markets, as witnessed by the high R-squared values for the 
regression models high overall F values. By doing this study, 
there is conclusive evidence that the price of oil had a great 
impact on the stock markets during the Crisis in the Persian Gulf. 
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Table 1 
1. S&P 500 
Independent Variable 
and # of Observations Overall F 
Regression 
Coefficient 
spot Oil Price (157) 
Futures oil Price (156) 
261. 83 
254.76 
* 
* 
0.7728 
0.7691 
2. Dow Jones Industrial Average 
spot Oil Price (157) 
Futures oil Price (156) 
243.58 
221.25 
* 
* 
0.7598 
0.7431 
-3.157 
-4.857 
-26.041 
-39.377 
3. Dow Jones Transportion Average 
spot oil Price (157) 
Futures oil Price (156) 
282.87* 
* 351. 95 
0.7860 
0.8215 
4. Treasury Bond Price Index 
spot oil Price (157) 
Futures oil Price (156) 
1.99 
1.88 
0.0252 
0.0240 
5. Corporate Bond Price Index 
spot Oil Price (157) 1.10 
Futures oil Price (156) 799.25 
0.0140 
0.9126 
*. .. Slgnlflcant at 1% 
**. .. Slgnlflcant at 10% 
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-15.986 
-25.784 
37513.032 
56786.605 
-1693.783 
-.8089 
T-Value 
* 
-15.78 
* 
-15.43 
* 
-17.06 
* 
-16.01 
* 
-17.20 
* 
-19.47 
** 1.92 
** 1.86 
-1.22 
* 
-6.69 
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